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INTRODUCTION 
 
The main objectives of this paper are (a) to overview the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector, 
(b) to examine the performance of Ukraine’s iron and steel industry during the post-
communist transformation, (c) to discover major challenges the industry has been faced 
with since the beginning of the 1990s, and (d) to evaluate corporate and public policy 
responses vis-à-vis the challenging environment of transformation and globalisation. This 
paper proceeds in four sections. The first part sets the stage by introducing the Ukrainian 
ferrous metals industry and its major enterprises. The second section examines the 
economic outcomes generated by the Ukrainian iron and steel industry under post-
communism. The third section establishes and identifies a number of basic short-term 
problems and fundamental long-term challenges of the Ukrainian steel industry with 
regard to technological advancement, market access and development, resource base, and 
ownership transformation. Finally, this paper analyses the industry’s current corporate 
and public policy environment in Ukraine. 
 
The project’s overall methodological framework is developed along the lines of the study 
of comparative economic systems with its appropriate adaptation and simplification for 
the study of separate industries or sectors. The methodology is based on the works of 
John Elliot (1973), Andrew Zimbalist (1984), Morris Bornstein (1985), Stephen Gardner 
(1998), Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart (1999). It identifies the economic outcomes of the 
iron and steel industry as the dependent variable to be analysed though three basic criteria 
such as output and sales growth, efficiency, and stability. The independent variables are 
the resource base of the industry (=natural resources and raw materials, labour, and 
capital) and the economic system (=ownership arrangements and co-ordination 
mechanisms). Exogenous influences that affect the industry’s performance – the 
environment – are regarded as an intervening variable. In addition, possible reform 
attempts and policies that the decision-makers choose to implement are considered to be 
the second intervening variable. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the present 
methodological framework. 
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Figure 1. Forces influencing economic outcomes  
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Source: Compiled on the basis of Ruud Knaack, ‘Dynamic Comparative Economics: 
Lessons from Socialist Planning’, in Andrew Zimbalist, ed., Comparative Economic 
Systems: Present Views (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1984), pp. 109-132; H. 
Stephen Gardner, Comparative Economic Systems, 2nd edn (Fort Worth, TX: The Dryden 
Press, 1998); and Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Comparative Economic Systems, 
6th edn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999). 
 
 
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
 
Prior to discussing the performance and challenges of the Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry under post-communism, one should overview the central characteristics of the 
ferrous metals sector. What was the magnitude of Ukraine’s ferrous metals production 
within the Soviet Union and on the world scale? Where are the industrial capacities 
situated within the country? What are the industry’s core products and major producers? 
How is the technological cycle organised? This section responds to the questions above. 
 
During its 130 year-long history, the Ukrainian iron and steel industry has developed into 
a fully-grown manufacturing sector. It involves the entire technological cycle of 
economic activities designed for the production of iron, steel, and a large number of semi- 
and fully-finished metal products. The Ukrainian ferrous metals capacities include: (1) the 
extraction, processing and agglomeration of iron, manganese and chromic iron ores; (2) 
the extraction and processing of fire-clay, refractory and complementary materials; (3) the 
production of coal coke; (4) the production of cast iron, blast furnace ferroalloys, crude 
steel, rolled metals, steel tubes, electric ferroalloys, and special metal materials for 
mechanical engineering; (5) the recycling of scrap metal. The Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry also incorporates a large number of non-metallic raw material deposits, mining, 
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quarrying, and processing capacities, which produce flux, fire-clays, kaolin, dolomite, and 
metallurgical limestone.  
 
The industry’s historical development has been spatially located around huge iron ore and 
coal deposits, water resources, and electric power facilities of the Donbas-Dnieper Bend 
in the east of Ukraine. Beginning in the 1870s, the Ukrainian iron and steel industry 
provided the basis for the industrial expansion of the Imperial Russia. Subsequently, 
Ukraine’s iron and steel works became a vital element in the Soviet Union’s 
industrialisation drive under Stalin in the 1930s. Table 1 indicates that Ukraine’s ferrous 
metals sector has maintained its significance for the Soviet economy throughout the entire 
historical period. 
 
Table 1. Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector within the USSR, 1986 
 As % of total Soviet Union’s output 
Iron ore 48 
Manganese ore 72 
Pig iron 43 
Crude steel 35 
Finished rolled ferrous metals 35 
Steel tubes 35 
 As % of total Soviet Union’s size 
Ukraine’s territory 2.7 
Ukraine’s population  18.2 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of USSR State Statistics Committee, Narodnoe 
khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1987); Ukrainian SSR State 
Statistics Committee, Ukrainskaia SSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu (Kyiv: Tekhnika,1988). 
 
Since the end of WWII, the overwhelming importance of the Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry for the economic development of the USSR had been gradually eroded by the 
development of new ferrous metals hubs in Central Russia and Siberia. Map 1 shows the 
wider geographical distribution of the Soviet metals sector achieved by the early 1980s.  
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Map 1. The geography of ferrous and non-ferrous metals centres in the USSR, 1982. Source: http://www.1uptravel.com/worldmaps/russia54.html
Nonetheless, by the end of state socialism, Ukraine had managed to remain one of the 
world’s major metallurgical complexes. Table 2 demonstrates that in the mid-1980s, 
Ukraine’s production of iron ore and crude steel was amongst the top 3 to 4 largest in the 
world. 
 
Table 2. Ukraine’s ferrous metals industry within the world, 1985-1986 
Rank Country Crude steel
million tonnes 
(% of  world output) 
Rank Country Iron ore 
 million 
tonnes  
1. USSR 
of which, Ukraine 
161 (22) 
56.6 (8) 
1. USSR 
of which, Ukraine 
250 
120 
2. Japan 98 (14) 2. China 151 
3. United States 75 (10) 3. Australia 91 
4. China 52.5 (7) 4. Brazil 70 
5. West Germany 38 (5) 5. United States 49 
6. Italy 23 (3) 6. India 42 
7. Brazil 20.5 (3) 7. Canada 40 
8. Poland 17.1 (2) 8. South Africa 24.5 
9. Czechoslovakia 15.1 (2) 9. Sweden 20.6 
10. United Kingdom 14.7 (2) 10. Liberia 15 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of USSR State Statistics Committee, Narodnoe 
khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1987); Ukrainian SSR State 
Statistics Committee, Ukrainskaia SSR v tsifrakh v 1988 godu (Kyiv: Tekhnika,1988); 
International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition (Brussels: 
IISI, 2003). 
 
In 1990, there were thirty two iron and steel works functioning in Ukraine. The Ukrainian 
iron and steel industry has long been characterised by one of the world’s highest levels of 
industrial establishment concentration: 98 per cent of pig iron and 97 per cent of crude 
steel are produced by steel works with an annual crude steel output of over one million 
tonne per year.† One of the most common forms of the organisation of production in the 
Ukrainian ferrous metals industry has been kombinat – a combine of integrated 
complementary industrial factories processing iron ore materials, coking coal, casting 
iron, smelting and rolling steel, and manufacturing finished metal products. In addition to 
the complete production cycle enterprises, there has been a large number of iron and steel 
works with an exclusive specialisation in producing pig iron and crude steel. 
Reprocessing metallurgy has been concentrated on the electric furnace production of 
                                                 
† However, establishment (or plant-) concentration in a given market is usually much lower than firm-
concentration. For instance, in 2002, the average annual crude steel output of the world’s largest 80 steel 
producing companies was 7.7 million tonnes. The biggest Ukrainian steel company – Kryvorizhstal – 
produced 6.9 million tonnes that year. 
 7
finished rolled metals, special steels and ferroalloys. Apart from the large iron and steel 
works, ‘small metallurgy’ has also been present in the country. Small steel mills typically 
function within large heavy engineering companies and produce metal products for 
machine-building purposes. However, under post-communism, different foundries, 
rolling shops, and mills within several large steel combines have been divided into 
independent mini-mills or finished metals firms.  
 
Geographically, the Ukrainian iron and steel works are concentrated in the Donbas-
Dnieper Bend within three ferrous metals areas. A half of Ukraine’s steel works are 
located in the Donbas (Donets Coal Basin) – around the coal fuel resources – and at the 
coastal plain around the Sea of Azov – a natural commercial gate-way and transportation 
route. Another half of the iron and steel works are situated in the lower Dnieper River 
region – around the deposits of iron and manganese ores and vast water reservoirs. Thus, 
according to Ukraine’s current administrative division, almost the entire iron and steel 
industry is located in four neighbouring south-eastern provinces - Dnipropetrovsk, 
Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasti (see Map 2).  
 
Fourteen iron and steel works are grouped around the lower Dnieper River region. The 
Dnipropetrovsk industrial hub includes ferrous metals enterprises located in the cities of 
Dnipropetrovsk (four), Dniprodzerzhynsk, and Novomoskovsk, which produce pig-iron, 
crude steel, rolled ferrous metals, steel tubes, railway wheels, bridge construction 
elements, and metal alloys. The Zaporizhzhia industrial hub includes three ferrous metals 
companies which produce pig-iron, thin hot- and cold-rolled slab steel, moulded steel, 
transformer steel, white plates, bent rolled metal profiles, cold rolled sheet steel for the 
motor-car industry, and special steels for the heavy engineering industry. The Kryvyi Rih 
industrial hub covers one of the world largest iron and manganese ore deposits, open-cast 
mines, Ukraine’s currently largest iron and steel complex of Kryvyi Rih, a number of ore 
mining and processing combines and agglomeration plants (Southern, Central, Northern, 
Kryvyi Rih, Sukha Balka, and Inhulets factories), as well as a tube-rolling plant and a 
ferroalloys factory, both at the town of Nikopol. Two manganese ore mining and 
processing combines – at Marhanets and Ordzhenikidze – also operate in the surrounding 
area of Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In addition, the lower Dnieper River ferrous metals region 
includes the Kremenchuk iron ore deposits with its Poltava Ore Mining and Processing 
Combine. 
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The Donbas ferrous metals area includes thirteen iron and steel works, and the thirteen of 
Ukraine’s eighteen coal coking plants. The Donetsk-Makiivka industrial hub consists of 
four ferrous metals works (two in each city respectively), a number of coal coking plants, 
tube-rolling mills, and fire-clay factories. A modernised iron and steel works and a new 
mini-mill are situated at the Yenakieve industrial hub. The Alchevsk industrial hub 
includes one of the largest iron and steel combines and a ferroalloys factory. The 
Khartsyzsk industrial hub includes three ferrous metals producing enterprises (one steel 
works, one tube mill, and one steel wire factory). There are also several independent iron 
and steel works in the Donbas cities of Kramatorsk and Kostiantynivka. Small steel mills 
function at almost each of Ukraine’s largest heavy engineering factories. The ferrous 
metals area around the Sea of Azov includes the country’s second and third largest steel-
producing combines in Mariupol as well as a small  iron and steel factory at Kerch and 
the iron ore deposits around the city of Kerch on the Crimean peninsula. The two iron and 
steel works in Mariupol produce iron, steel, and a wide range of rolled metals, consuming 
the raw materials from the Kerch and, partially, Kryvyi Rih iron ore deposits. The ferrous 
metals industry of this area is closely related to local heavy engineering factories, coal 
coking plants, as well as the companies that produce chemicals, fertilizers, and 
construction materials (for an historical overview of the Ukrainian metals sector see 
Chumachenko 1977: 90-117; Zastavnyi 1990: 113-116; Petryha 1999).  
 
By the turn of the century, the majority of the Ukrainian steel works have been operating 
within a complete technological cycle of production, casting from 1 to 7 million tonnes of 
crude steel per year. Since the beginning of privatisation in 1992, the overwhelming 
majority of the steel works have been commercialised and either fully privatised or placed 
under the private corporate management control. In terms of the existing steel-making 
capacity‡, Ukraine’s largest steel producing companies are as follows: the Azovstal Iron 
and Steel Combine (Mariupol, (formerly Zhdanov), Donetsk oblast; 1999 reported 
capacity: 8.3 million tonnes of crude steel); the Mariupol Illich Iron and Steel Combine 
(Mariupol Donetsk oblast; 7.200 mln.); the Dniprospetsstal Dnieper Special Steel Works 
                                                 
‡ The steel-producing capacity figures are of 1999 as reported by the OECD 2001. 
 
Map 2. Ukraine’s current administrative divisions 
Source: The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Map Service (http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/research)
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(Zaporizhzhia; 5.800 mln.); the Kryvorizhstal State Iron and Steel Combine (Kryvyi Rih, 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast; 5.050 mln.)§; the Makiivka Kirov Iron and Steel Works 
(Makiivka, Donetsk oblast; 4.050 mln.); the Dniprovsky Dzerzhinsky Iron and Steel 
Combine (Dniprodzerzhynsk; 3.850 mln.); the Zaporizhstal Iron and Steel Combine 
(Zaporizhzhia; 3.600 mln); the Alchevsk Iron and Steel Combine (Alchevsk (formerly 
Komunarsk), Luhansk oblast; 3.290 mln.); the Yenakieve Iron and Steel Works 
(Yenakieve, Donetsk oblast; 3.000 mln.); the Dnipropetrovsk Petrovsky Iron and Steel 
Works (Dnipropetrovsk; 1.000 mln.); the Kostiantynivka Iron and Steel Works 
(Kostiantynivka, Donetsk oblast; 1.000 mln.); the Donetsk Iron and Steel Works 
(Donetsk; 0.840 mln.); the ISTIL-Donetsk Iron and Steel Mini-Mill (Donetsk; 0.840 
mln.); the Dnieper Special Steel Electrometallurgical Mill (Zaporizhzhia; 0.750 mln.); the 
Kramatorsk Iron and Steel Works (Kramatorsk, Donetsk oblast; 0.700 mln.); the 
Energomashspetsstal Energy Machine-Building Special Steel Mill (Kramatorsk, Donetsk 
oblast; 0.600 mln.). In terms of sales turnover, the current ranking order of the Ukrainian 
steel producers is different to some extent. Figure 2 assesses the size of Ukraine’s ferrous 
metals companies by their latest annual sales figures reported. Between 1999 and 2002, 
the biggest five steel producers – Kryvorizhstal, Mariupol Illich, Azovstal, Zaporizhstal, 
and Alchevsk – had been making on average the two-thirds of industry sales, while over 
fifteen other companies accounted for another one-third of industry revenue turnover. 
 
Figure 2. Ukraine’s steel companies by average annual revenue share, 1999-2002 
Kryvorizhstal
17.8%
Mariupol 
Illich
17.3%
Azovstal
12.8%
Alchevsk
6.8%
Dnipropetro
vsk Petrovsky
3.0% Donetsk Iron 
and Steel 
Works
3.3%
Dnieper 
Special Steels
2.9%
Others*
13.6%
Dniprodzerz
hynsk
6.6%
Nikopol 
Ferroalloys
5.0%
Zaporizhstal
11.0%  
                                                 
§ Since 1999, Kryvorizhstal has been substantially increasing its production capacity to become the largest 
steel producer in Ukraine. It is the only fully state-owned Ukrainian steel producer. 
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Note: Others include the following ferrous metals-producing companies (by total sales 
revenues): Donetskstal Iron and Steel Works**, Zaporizhzhia Ferroalloys, Metalen 
Yenakieve**, Makiivka Iron and Steel Works, Donetsk Metal-Rolling Works**, ISTIL-
DMZ**, Yenakieve Iron and Steel Works, Silur Khartsyzsk**, Stakhanov Ferroalloys, 
Kremenchuk Steel Works, Zaporizhzhia Abrasive Plant, Energomashspetsstal 
Kramatorsk. **Business start-ups. 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 2001 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, 
May 2001); Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 
2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
Given the specific market position of the tube-rolling branch of the Ukrainian iron and 
steel industry, companies which manufacture steel tubes are separated statistically from 
the rest of the ferrous metals producers. Figure 3 shows the average market sales shares of 
the Ukrainian tube-rolling mills. By contrast with the crude steel production, the tube 
branch of the ferrous metals sector has been much more heavily concentrated: a single 
producing company – the Nyzhniodniprovsk Tube-Rolling Works – controls over 55 per 
cent of the tube sales, while the combined share of the largest four tube-rolling enterprises 
(including the Niko Tube Nikopol Seamless Tube Works, the Novomoskovsk Tube 
Works, and the Khartsyzsk Tube Works) amounts to over 80 per cent of the total reported 
product sales. 
 
Figure 3. Ukraine’s tube mills by average annual revenue share, 1999-2002 
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*Note: Others include Nikopol Pivdennyi Tube Mill, Dnipropetrovsk Comintern Iron and 
Steel Works, Nikopol UTIST Steel Tube Mill, Dnipropetrovsk Tube Mill, Sumy Frunze 
Weighted Boring Tube Works, Luhansk Tube Works. 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 2001 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, 
May 2001); Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 
2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
This overview of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry is concluded with an assessment of 
the key element of the industry’s market structure - its concentration. I have aggregated 
the annual gross revenue data of the Ukrainian ferrous metal-producing companies to 
examine whether the industry is dominated by a small number of large firms or made up 
of many small firms and what is the present degree of industrial concentration? Figure 4 
covers Ukraine’s iron and steel- producing companies and excludes iron and manganese 
ore mines, coal coking plants, and other raw materials firms. It shows that the Ukrainian 
ferrous metals sector has been characterised by a low level of industrial enterprise 
concentration. In 2002, the largest five steel companies accounted for 59 per cent of the 
total steel sales, while the gross revenue share of the top ten firms was 80 per cent of 
Ukraine’s crude steel production.  
 
Figure 4. The industrial concentration of the Ukrainian ferrous metals production, 
2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 
2003). 
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The overall number of functioning iron and steel works, tube mills, ferroalloys factories, 
and other ferrous metal-producing enterprises – big enough to have an impact on the 
market – currently exceeds thirty. Moreover, during the post-communist transformation, 
Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector on the whole has experienced some fragmentation, which 
was accompanied by a massive wave of newly-established iron and steel businesses, 
primarily in the field of steel products marketing and export facilitation. By the end of 
2002, there were 2538 small firms** and 600 large companies registered in Ukraine as 
commercial entities under the institutional classification section of ‘manufacture of basic 
metals and metal products’ (author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics 
Committee 2003:  Tables 7.4 and 14.37). 
 
 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Having overviewed the general characteristics of the Ukrainian ferrous metals industry, 
this paper turns now towards examining the economic performance of the sector during 
the post-communist transformation. There are three core issues that this section is focused 
on. Firstly, it examines the growth trajectory of the Ukrainian ferrous metals output and 
market sales. Secondly, the corporate and export performance of the Ukrainian iron and 
steel producers is explored. Consequently, the section turns to the efficiency, 
productivity, and profitability patterns of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry. Finally, 
the issue of the industry’s stability is discussed.  
 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
 
The post-communist transformation has made an enormous impact on the Ukrainian iron 
and steel industry. Figure 5 shows that within the first five years of Ukraine’s newly-
gained independence, the production of ferrous metals plummeted by almost 60 per cent. 
This sharp output decline affected the entire range of the ferrous metals produced in the 
country, extending from pig iron, crude steel and rolled metals, to steel strips and tubes. 
The output collapse was the most dramatic in the tube-rolling branch of the industry, 
where the steel tube production suffered an almost 80 per cent decline (see Figure 6).  
                                                 
** According to the Ukrainian legislation, small firms are those which employ less than 50 employees and 
have the total annual turnover of less than 0.5 million euro. 
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Figure 5. Ukraine’s ferrous metals production, absolute volume, 1985-2003 
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Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 
1995 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 1996); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi 
shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2000 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2001); Ukrainian State Statistics 
Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); and 
author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Vyrobnytstvo 
osnovnykh vydiv promyslovoi produktsii po misiatsiakh 2003 roku; available at 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2003/pr/ovp/ovp_u/arh_ovp.html. 
 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Ukrainian iron and steel industry began to show some 
visible signs of recovery. Since 1996, all major ferrous metal products manufactured in 
Ukraine, especially finished steel products, have been indicating strong output growth 
trends in absolute volume terms. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the revival of Ukraine’s 
ferrous metals output has only been mildly affected by the subsequent Asian and Russian 
economic crises of 1997-1998. Since Russia’s gas and oil giants remain the key 
consumers of Ukrainian steel tubes, Ukraine’s tube-rolling mills have appeared to be the 
main victim of the Russian financial turmoil of 1998. However, as Figure 6 shows, the 
problematic environment of the world markets notwithstanding, the Ukrainian production 
of steel tubes has recently recovered to one-third of its pre-transition output level. 
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Figure 6. Ukraine’s steel tube production, 1985-2003 
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Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 
1995 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 1996); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi 
shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2000 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2001); Ukrainian State Statistics 
Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); and 
author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Vyrobnytstvo 
osnovnykh vydiv promyslovoi produktsii po misiatsiakh 2003 roku; available at 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2003/pr/ovp/ovp_u/arh_ovp.html. 
 
The recovery of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry has preceded the overall revival of 
Ukraine’s economy by at least three years. Already in 1996, the Ukrainian steel industry 
recorded a 12 per cent annual sales increase. An 8 per cent growth followed in 1997. In 
1998, however, the Russian financial crisis, the ensuing loss of export contracts, and, 
most importantly, the extensive depreciation of the Ukrainian currency resulted in a 7 
percent decline of the Ukrainian steel industry’s sales. The ferrous metals output in 
absolute volume terms did not decline to such an extent. Figure 7 illustrates another 
feature of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry’s economic performance during the post-
communist transformation, namely its deeper output slump, even if compared with the 
overall industrial sector’s trajectory. By the end of 1995, Ukraine’s ferrous metals 
industry had lost 59 per cent of its pre-transition production, whereas the corresponding 
figure for the entire industrial sector was 48 per cent. On the whole, in contrast to the 
experience of other heavily industrialised Central and Eastern European countries, the 
post-communist transformation has led to a distinct V-shaped response of the Ukrainian 
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iron and steel industry. Figure 7 also shows that, since the second half of the 1990s, a 
protracted and deep fall in Ukraine’s ferrous metals sales has been followed by rapid 
recovery.   
 
Figure 7. Ukraine’s industrial sector and ferrous metals industry growth patterns, 
volume indices, 1990-2003 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); National Bank 
of Ukraine, Osnovni pokaznyky ekonomichnoho i sotsial’noho stanu Ukrainy 2001-2004 
roky (Kyiv: National Bank, 2004); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Vyrobnytstvo ta 
tempy pryrostu obsiahiv promyslovoi produktsii: Operatyvni danni (Kyiv: Derzhkomstat, 
2004). 
 
 
On the international scale, the turn of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry towards 
recovery has put the country back into the league of the largest steel producing countries. 
Figure 8 shows that in 2002 Ukraine occupied the seventh position. The country produced 
more crude steel than Brazil, India and Italy, but was firmly behind Russia, South Korea, 
Germany, and the world’s top three steel-producing giants (China, Japan, and the United 
States).  
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Figure 8. The major steel-producing countries, 2002 
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Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: 
IISI, 2004); International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition 
(Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
 
 
EXPORTS GROWTH 
 
The apparent recovery of Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector has been propelled by a 
remarkable export expansion. Between 1990 and 2002, Ukraine’s share in the world steel 
production halved to 4 per cent. Notwithstanding, by the late 1990s, Ukraine became one 
of the world’s top three major steel-exporting countries. Table 3 indicates that 
considering net export figures, Ukraine has almost become the world’s second largest 
steel exporter. Moreover, according to the national statistical account, in 2002, Ukraine 
exported 32 million tonnes of ferrous metals – the second largest amount of steel exports 
in the world after Japan. On the whole, the Ukrainian iron and steel companies have been 
exporting between 75 and 80 per cent of the domestically produced steel. Several 
Ukrainian iron and steel works have recently appeared in the league of the world’s largest 
steel exporting companies.  
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Table 3. The major exporters and importers of steel, million tonnes, 2002 
Rank Total exports Rank Total imports
1 Japan 35.2 1 United States 30.2 
2 Russia 27.7 2 China 29.2 
3 Ukraine 25.9 3 Germany 17.8 
4 Germany 24.7 4 Italy 16.6 
5 Belgium-Luxembourg 20.3 5 France 15.8 
6 France 17.6 6 South Korea 14.1 
7 South Korea 12.9 7 Belgium-Luxembourg 10.9 
8 Brazil 11.8 8 Taiwan 10.9 
9 Italy 11.4 9 Spain 10.4 
10 Turkey 11.0 10 Thailand 9.8 
11 Taiwan 8.8 11 United Kingdom 8.9 
12 Netherlands 7.2 12 Hong Kong 7.9 
13 China 6.8 13 Canada 7.7 
14 United Kingdom 6.6 14 Turkey 6.6 
15 Spain 6.3 15 Mexico 5.8 
World Total 317.4 World Total 310.1 
Rank Net exports (exports-imports) Rank Net imports (imports-exports)
1 Japan 31.9 1 United States 24.6 
2 Russia 25.54 2 China 22.4 
3 Ukraine 25.52 3 Hong Kong 5.4 
4 Brazil 11.0 4 Thailand 8.2 
5 Belgium-Luxembourg 9.4 5 Italy 5.2 
6 Germany 6.9 6 Iran 4.5 
7 Turkey 4.3 7 Spain 4.1 
8 Kazakhstan 3.7 8 Vietnam 4.6 
9 South Africa 3.0 9 United Arab Emirates 2.9 
10 Austria 2.4 10 Malaysia 2.8 
11 Romania 2.4 11 Portugal 2.5 
12 Argentina 2.2 12 Indonesia 2.4 
13 Venezuela 2.0 13 Singapore 2.38 
14 India 1.8 14 United Kingdom 2.2 
15 Netherlands 1.7 15 Philippines 1.7 
Note: Some of the IISI data in this table are based on exporters’ figures and understate the 
actual volume of imports. 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel 
Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: IISI, 2004); International Iron and Steel Institute, 
World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition (Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
 
The role of steel exports for the Ukrainian economy has been steadily increasing (see 
Figure 9). Between 1994 and 2002, the share of base metals and metal products – the key 
component of the statistical category of ‘manufactured goods, classified chiefly by 
material’ – in Ukraine’s total merchandise exports expanded from 39.5 to 44.6 per cent 
(or from US$ 3,721 million to US$ 7,126 million). In the course of the post-communist 
transformation, steel products have become the single largest Ukrainian export 
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commodity, accounting in 2002 for 30 per cent of the country’s total merchandise exports 
and worth US$ 5,300 million. 
 
Figure 9. The break-down of the Ukrainian merchandise exports, 1994-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1994 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 1995); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2000); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 
rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the major geographical destinations of Ukraine’s merchandise exports. 
The primary targets for the Ukrainian steel export are China, the countries of South-East 
Asia, Russia and the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and some EU member states. 
The rest of the world appears to be of secondary importance, as the great bulk of the 
Ukrainian steel export has been barred from the U.S. market. Although the data on the 
geographical distribution of ferrous metals exported from Ukraine are not widely 
available, it is contended that the illustration provided in Figure 10 is rather accurate in 
this regard. 
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Figure 10. The major destinations of Ukrainian merchandise exports, 1994-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1994 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 1995); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2000); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 
rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003). 
 
 
CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
 
The overall examination of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry’s growth and export 
patterns under post-communism would be incomplete without an analysis of its corporate 
performance. Therefore, in this subsection the industrial output trends are disaggregated 
according to sales and export revenues of different iron and steel-producing companies. 
By separating the Ukrainian producers of ferrous metals by size, one can see more clearly 
the difference in scale between them as well as what type of companies has been behind 
the recent industrial recovery. Figure 11 shows the gross revenue growth figures reported 
by Ukraine’s largest iron and steel works, while the market sales performance of the 
small producers of ferrous metals is provided in Figure 12.  
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Figure 11. Ukraine’s large ferrous metals companies, gross revenue growth, 1999-
2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 2001 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, 
May 2001); Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 
2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
 
The first remarkable corporate feature of the post-communist transformation of the 
Ukrainian iron and steel industry has been the massive difference in sales revenues. 
Figure 11 shows that in 2002, the annual gross revenue of an average large Ukrainian 
steel company approached 2 billion hryvnia (over US$ 370 million), while each of the 
two steel giants – Kryvorizhstal and Mariupol Illich – sold steel products worth well over 
US$ 1 billion. Figure 12 indicates that the corresponding figure for Ukraine’s small steel 
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producers, predominantly tube-rolling mills, has been just 158,000 hryvnia or US$ 
30,000. 
 
Figure 12. Ukraine’s small ferrous metals companies, gross revenue growth, 1999-
2002 
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2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
Another major finding is that it is the large steel companies that have emerged as the 
locomotive of the industry’s revival; the sales reported by the big companies have been 
registering a steady growth tendency, whereas the small producers’ sales figures have 
been in decline. Figure 13 indicates that, similarly to the overall gross revenue trajectory, 
the largest Ukrainian steel companies have appeared to be the biggest exporters as well. 
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However, most recently, the export sales have not been growing as fast as the overall 
market sales. Moreover, except for the constantly expanding Kryvorizhstal Iron and Steel 
Combine and the other four largest companies, the sales performance of the majority of 
Ukraine’s steel firms has been rather erratic. This tendency can be observed most vividly 
in the field of exports as illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Ukraine’s iron and steel companies export growth, 1999-2002 
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 24
Thus, the disaggregated data analysed in this subsection allow for the following 
conclusions. First of all, the overall sales performance of the Ukrainian iron and steel 
companies has generally corresponded with the overall industry’s recovery and economic 
growth in Ukraine. However, while the production of major ferrous metals has been 
steadily increasing in absolute volume as well as in terms of sales since 1996, the annual 
revenues and export performance of the majority of the Ukrainian steel companies have 
been rather erratic. A small number of ferrous metals companies have recently taken the 
leading market positions, whereas the majority of Ukraine’s steel companies have been 
lagging far behind, and some are in an apparent decline. 
 
EFFICIENCY  
 
Industrial growth understood as an increase in the volume of output or sales is the first 
criterion of a sector’s economic performance. Another essential criterion for the 
assessment of industrial performance is efficiency. Economics is primarily focused on an 
abstract Pareto-optimal efficiency of perfect competition, where ‘no one could be made 
better off without making someone else worse off’. Three are three types of economic 
efficiency discussed in the literature. Roughly defined, the first type is productive 
efficiency, in which the output of the industry is produced at the lowest cost. The second 
is allocative efficiency, in which resources are allocated to the production of the goods 
and services the society requires. The third is distributional efficiency, in which output is 
distributed in such a way that consumers would not wish – within their disposable income 
and market price constraints – to spend these incomes in a different way (Bannock, 
Baxter, and Davis 1992: 127).  
 
As economists emphasise, maximum economic efficiency can exist only in an ideal-type 
economy, in which perfect competition characterise every sector.  By focusing on the 
efficiency of the real-world economic system, one aims at measuring the effectiveness 
with which a system uses its resources at a given time (static efficiency) or through time 
(dynamic efficiency). It is also important to understand different growth experiences, 
while studying economic systems. As Gregory and Stuart have emphasised: 
 
Economic growth and dynamic efficiency are not the same. The output of a 
system may grow by increasing efficiency (finding better ways of doing 
things with the same resources) or by expanding the amount of, say, labour 
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but using that labour at a constant rate of effectiveness. The former is often 
termed intensive growth, the latter extensive growth (1999: 44). 
 
It is very difficult to measure economic efficiency, given the technological complexity of 
the modern manufacturing as well as the lack of data needed to analyse all the types of 
efficiency both in static and dynamic terms. Furthermore, the allocative and distributional 
aspects of economic efficiency are typically attributed to a country’s economy as whole 
rather than to a specific sector or an industry. This research paper’s approach is to focus 
on the productive efficiency of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, which is evaluated 
comparatively on the ‘output per employee’ basis as well as in terms of enterprise 
profitability. As in the previous part of the paper, this section uses the statistical data set 
which has been specifically assembled to reveal the performance patterns of Ukraine’s 
ferrous metals industry during the post-communist transformation.  
 
Figure 14 provides the data on labour productivity in a number of the world’s largest 
steel-producing countries. Various differences in coverage and definition of ‘employment 
in the steel industry’ exist: in some countries the entire ferrous metals industry’s 
workforce is included, while in other countries the steel industry’s employment covers 
only the shop floor. Furthermore, some national statistical agencies provide the 
employment data for the ferrous metals sector, whilst other agencies cover the 
employment in the ‘manufacturing of base metals and metal products’, which include 
non-ferrous metals as well. Given the International Iron and Steel Institute’s own 
conclusion that ‘inter-country comparisons are of dubious value’ (2003: 19), one has to be 
cautious in this regard. The labour productivity data on Ukraine and Poland presented in 
Figure 14 are directly comparable as they have been gathered specially for this paper 
following the analogous techniques. The productivity figures for other major steel-
producing countries were calculated on the basis of the steel employment data provided 
by the IISI. Figure 14 shows that labour productivity in the two East European steel 
industries has been significantly lower throughout the entire period than in any other 
major steel industry, for which the data are available. Even after a considerable recovery 
in labour productivity terms which has been achieved in Ukraine since 1995, the average 
Ukrainian steel worker produces currently only 70 per cent of his 1990 output level. 
Comparing to the ferrous metals sector in the other countries, the average Ukrainian steel 
worker produces only 76 per cent of the average Polish steel worker’s output, 18 per cent 
of the average Brazilian steel worker’s output, 14 per cent of the average EU steel 
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worker’s output, 11 per cent of the U.S. output per worker level, and 10 per cent of the 
average South Korean steel worker’s output. 
 
Figure 14. Crude steel production per employee, 1990, 1995, 2002 
Labour productivity
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2003); Polish Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 
2000 (Warsaw: GUS, 2001); Polish Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Poland 2002 (Warsaw: GUS, 2003); International Iron and Steel Institute, 
Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: IISI, 2004); International Iron and Steel 
Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition (Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
 
Whether a firm makes a profit or a loss is regarded as the second signal of its productive 
efficiency. The evolution of profitability rates (understood here formally as total sales 
revenue minus total production costs) of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry is given in 
Figure 15. Here the steel industry characteristics are contrasted with the profitability 
trends of Ukraine’s overall industrial sector. On the whole, the Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry during the post-communist transformation has been characterised by mediocre 
and falling profitability rates. It is believed that very high industrial profitability rates of 
the early 1990s should be regarded with some caution. Following the price liberalisation, 
the producer prices rose in 1992 by a staggering 4,229 per cent, while the consumer price 
 27
index inflation that year was 2,100 per cent. In 1993, the producer price index was up by 
9,768 per cent, whereas the CPI inflation rose to 10,256 per cent. In such an unstable 
environment, Ukraine’s industrial enterprises were able to acquire bank credits under 
what appeared to be effectively negative interest rates. For example, between 1992 and 
1993, the amount of commercial credit debts had grown by 28 times. Figure 15 
demonstrates that the profitability patterns of the industrial sector and its steel branch 
have been roughly similar. Notwithstanding the generally dubious profitability data due to 
profit underreporting practices, which are wide-spread in most of the post-communist 
economies, Figure 15 also shows until very recently that the profitability of the Ukrainian 
ferrous metals industry has fallen considerably and that the production of ferrous metals 
has been less profitable than the production of other industrial goods. Moreover, the steel 
manufacturers made no profits in 1997 and even registered a loss the following year. At 
the very end of the 1999, the Ukrainian ferrous metals companies returned to profit-
making. 
 
Figure 15. Ukraine’s annual industrial profitability trends, 1992-2002 
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Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 
1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi 
shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003). 
 
Figure 16 provides the latest available disaggregate statistics concerning the profit figures 
reported by the largest Ukrainian iron and steel companies. It shows that all but two large 
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steel companies have registered a massive rise in profits in 2000, with an average gross 
profit figure approaching 250,000 hryvnia (or US$ 46,000). Nevertheless, from 2001 
onward the reported profits of all the companies have been falling yet again. 
 
Figure 16. Ukraine’s large steel companies, reported gross profits, 1999-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 2001 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, 
May 2001); Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 
2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
The profit patterns of Ukraine’s smaller ferrous metals companies within the reported 
period have been even more dismal. Figure 17 indicates that the profits of Ukraine’s tube-
rolling and ferroalloy-producing mills have not only rapidly declined, but by 2003 the 
majority of the smaller companies have been making losses. 
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Figure 17. Ukraine’s small steel companies, reported gross profits, 1999-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
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2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
It should be emphasised, however, that low returns and financial losses have been one of 
the major features of the world steel industry for a very long time. As the British 
conservative weekly The Economist has recently put it: ‘Even by “old economy” 
standards, steel making is hardly a business that sets pulses racing’ (22 February 2001). 
For instance, during the world steel industry’s boom in 2000, the West European steel 
giants – Arbed, ThyssenKrupp, and Usinor – reported returns on equity to be only 
between 12 and 15 per cent (The Economist, 23 November 2000). Thus, the lack of 
spectacular profit figures coming from the Ukrainian iron and steel companies ought to be 
at least partially attributed to a fiercely competitive environment of the world steel 
markets. Nonetheless, having considered the efficiency outcome of the post-communist 
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transformation, one has to conclude that the overall productive efficiency of the 
Ukrainian iron and steel industry has been very low. The reported profit margins of the 
overwhelming majority of the steel companies, albeit recovering, are still considerably 
narrow; and the average Ukrainian steel worker has not only become one of the least 
productive in the world, but he has been producing less output under post-communism 
than he used to produce under late state socialism. 
 
STABILITY 
 
In addition to increases in the volume of output that an industry generates over time, and 
to effectiveness with which an industrial enterprise utilises its available resources, 
stability is considered to be another essential criterion used in assessing economic 
performance. This sub-section examines the economic stability of Ukraine’s ferrous 
metals sector during the post-communist transformation. The focus here is on the 
industry’s trade (or business) cycles, i.e. fluctuations in growth. The trade cycle, 
understood as regular fluctuations in the level of income, is a very common economic 
phenomenon. Although there exists no general agreement in the economic theory about 
the exact cause of cycles, this problem has been well-studied by a large number of 
prominent economists, including Kondratieff, Kuznets, Samuelson, Hicks, Goodwin, 
Phillips and Kalecki. Since the times of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, most 
governments of industrially advanced countries have been trying to develop an economic 
policy to reduce the amplitude of the cycle and to stabilise the output on a generally 
upward growth trend path. The great output contractions experienced during the initial 
stages of the post-communist transformation have heated the theoretical debate and 
produced a number of competing approaches. This paper considers possible causes of the 
post-communist ‘Great Contraction’ of Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector in the next 
section.  
 
With regard to the economic outcomes of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, there 
appears to be two similarly ‘stable’ periods in the industry’s post-communist 
development. The production of ferrous metals had been steadily declining during the 
first transformation phase, which lasted until 1996. From then onwards the output as well 
as the sales of most steel products have been steadily on the rise. Moreover, since the late 
1990s, the industry’s most troubled tube-rolling branch has not experienced any major 
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negative growth trajectory. However, if one examines the two distinct output growth 
periods jointly, it becomes evident that the performance of the Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry during the post-communist 1990s has been particularly uneven: a sharp 59 per 
cent decline in production between 1990 and 1995 has been followed by a fast 36 
percentage point recovery by 2004, when the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector approached 
77 per cent of its 1990 production level in monetary terms. Furthermore, Figure 18 clearly 
indicates that the recovery of the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector has been rather 
unbalanced as well. The annual growth rates have been fluctuating from 8.1 per cent in 
1997 to -6.8 per cent in 1998; from 21.3 per cent in 2000 to 3.9 per cent in 2002 and to 
19.5 per cent in 2003. Figure 18 also shows that the recovery trajectory of Ukraine’s total 
industrial sector has been much steadier. Nonetheless, one should accentuate that since 
the second half of the 1990s, the Ukrainian iron and steel industry has followed a 
generally upward growth path. 
 
Figure 18. The Ukrainian iron and steel industry’s growth trends, 1996-2003 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); National Bank 
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roky (Kyiv: National Bank, 2004); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Vyrobnytstvo ta 
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2004). 
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Another highly unstable feature of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry during the post-
communist transformation has been the corporate profit growth rates. Figure 19 shows 
that between 2000 and 2002 Ukraine’s ferrous metals companies reported annual profit 
figures ranging from an average growth of 1540 per cent in 2000 to an average 50 per 
cent loss in 2001 and 2002. Thus, the era of the post-communist transformation has been 
an extremely unstable period for the Ukrainian steel companies’ profits. The sales and 
output growth rates, price levels and profit figures have all registered massive declines to 
be followed by rather rapid increases both of cyclical and non-cyclical nature. 
 
Figure 19. Annual profit growth reported by Ukraine’s iron and steel companies, 
2000-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: 
Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 2001 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, 
May 2001); Ukrainian Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy 
2002 (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2002); Ukrainian Investment 
Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia 
Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003). 
 
 
THE INDUSTRY’S POST-COMMUNIST CHALLENGES 
 
To understand whether and how the Ukrainian iron and steel industry can be made 
sustainable in the long run, one has to question the factors behind the sector’s ‘Great Post-
Communist Contraction’ and the industry’s overall unbalanced economic and commercial 
performance. Firstly, this third part of the research paper considers the applicability of the 
traditional ‘declining industry’ hypothesis, which is related to the phenomenon of ‘de-
industrialisation’ experienced by the industrially advanced countries of the West. 
Consequently, this section identifies five fundamental problems that the Ukrainian ferrous 
metals sector has been faced with under post-communism in the spheres of technology, 
market access and development, resources, and ownership transformation. It is contended 
that the relatively poor growth, efficiency, and stability outcomes generated by the 
Ukrainian steel industry after the collapse of state socialism ought to be attributed to these 
five central transformation-related variables.  
 
A DECLINING INDUSTRY? 
 
In the 1970s, the major industrially advanced countries began to experience the 
phenomenon of ‘de-industrialisation’, which was identified with the contraction of output 
or employment in the industrial sector as a whole, and with a steadily falling share of 
manufacturing in the total workforce and production. As Ajit Singh and other scholars 
have argued, in some cases, de-industrialization should be regarded simply as a normal 
response to changing technology and tastes and does not signify any structural 
disequilibrium in the economy as whole with malignant consequences (see Singh 1987). 
According to the conventional economic theory, an industry’s decline and, ultimately, its 
disappearance are usually related to the following factors:  
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Industries can decline because their products have been replaced by new and 
better products, or industries can decline because what used to be most 
cheaply produced in country A is now most cheaply produced in country B 
and exported to country A. In the first case, the word processor replaces the 
typewriter. In the second case, steel production moves from the United States 
to Brazil and American needs are met with imports from Brazil (Thurow 
1987). 
 
Could one possibly claim that Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector has become an ailing 
industry? From a theoretical perspective, the Ukrainian iron and steel industry can decline 
if it faces a new replacement product. Alternatively, the iron and steel production in the 
country can become too expensive to be sustained and, consequently, the industry would 
shift to another country. Concerning the replacement products, the arrival and industrial-
scale expansion of advanced plastic and concrete materials, which, since the early 1960s, 
have been widely used in manufacturing and construction all over the world, have 
provided new competitive substitutes for steel. Nonetheless, as Figure 20 shows, the 
world steel production has actually increased since 1970 in absolute volume terms by 
over 50 per cent, from 595 million tonnes to 902 million tonnes respectively. 
 
Figure 20. World crude steel production, 1970-2002 
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Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition 
(Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
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If one applies the industry shifting hypothesis, it would appear that Ukraine’s ferrous 
metals sector can hardly qualify for a typical declining industry status. As it has been 
mentioned earlier, according to the commodity structure of Ukraine’s foreign trade, 
ferrous metals comprise over 30 per cent of the country’s total exports, whereas the 
imported steel products account for just over 2 per cent of Ukraine’s total imports. Figure 
21 indicates that the Ukrainian import of base metals has been very modest under post-
communism, and that the country runs a huge foreign trade surplus with regard to ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals and metal products.  
 
Figure 21. Base metals in Ukraine’s foreign trade, 1994-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, Ukraine: Restoring Growth with Equity (Washington, D.C: World 
Bank, 1999); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy 
za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi 
shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003).  
 
 
Moreover, while the Ukrainian steel companies export the overwhelming part of their 
produce (about 80 per cent), the domestic demand for crude steel as well as finished metal 
products seems to be sufficiently met by local producers. Thus, Ukraine’s ferrous metals 
sector is not in the process of replacement by some competing steel producers from 
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overseas. What other factors can then account for growth, efficiency, and stability-related 
problems of the Ukrainian steel industry under post-communism? 
 
DOMESTIC MARKET’S COLLAPSE 
 
The collapse of the domestic market for Ukraine’s ferrous metals is considered to be the 
major cause of the industry’s crisis in the first half of the 1990s. Figure 22 compares the 
level of steel consumption across the globe. It shows the magnitude of the collapse of 
Ukraine’s domestic steel consumption under post-communism: while in the early 1990s 
the Ukrainian domestic market for steel had been as large (on a per capita basis) as that of 
any industrially advanced economy of the West, by 2002, it contracted by 80 per cent. 
The current level of Ukraine’s crude steel consumption is twice as low as the world’s 
average. 
 
Figure 22. International crude steel consumption, 1993-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); International 
Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition (Brussels: IISI, 2003); 
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International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: IISI, 
2004). 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, the collapse of the Ukrainian steel industry was 
accompanied by a similar scale of output decline in heavy engineering (i.e. machine-
building and military armaments) and construction – the two major domestic consumers 
of steel. Figure 23 demonstrates that in the second half of the 1990s, the Ukrainian steel-
producing firms have found other (=overseas) market niches to compensate for the lack of 
locally-placed orders. The overall sales of ferrous metals produced in Ukraine have been 
growing since 1996, whilst the domestic industrial consumption remained stagnant until 
2000. It is contended that, given the highly volatile nature of the world steel market, the 
underdevelopment of the domestic market for steel products in Ukraine should be 
regarded as one of the industry’s long-term challenges.  
 
Figure 23. The post-communist growth trajectory of Ukraine’s steel, engineering, 
and construction sectors, 1990-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2003); National Bank of Ukraine, Osnovni pokaznyky ekonomichnoho i sotsial’noho 
stanu Ukrainy 2001-2004 roky (Kyiv: National Bank, 2004); Ukrainian State Statistics 
Committee, Vyrobnytstvo ta tempy pryrostu obsiahiv promyslovoi produktsii: Operatyvni 
danni (Kyiv: Derzhkomstat, 2004). 
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OVERSEAS MARKETS’ RESTRICTIONS 
 
The overseas steel market expansion notwithstanding, since 1992, the Ukrainian iron and 
steel industry has been faced with what a recent International Monetary Fund report 
describes as ‘a plethora’ of anti-dumping investigations and external market restrictions 
(2003). Export opportunities of the Ukrainian iron and steel producers have been badly 
damaged by a wave of anti-dumping sanctions, import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
and other protectionist measures imposed by the European Union, the United States, and 
a number of other steel-producing countries. Currently, 69 restrictive measures imposed 
between 1999 and 2002 against Ukrainian steel exports are in place. Table 4 summarises 
the most recent protectionist measures applied by a number of the World Trade 
Organisation member states. 
 
Table 4. Anti-dumping duties imposed by WTO trading partners against 
Ukraine’s ferrous metals in 2001-02 
Product Country of 
destination 
Year of 
application 
Measure 
Flat non-coiled rolled 
metal 
USA 2001 Duty - 90.33% 
Reinforced steel USA 2001 Duty - 41.69% 
Flat non-coiled rolled 
metal 
Canada 2001 Duty - 96% 
Reinforced steel Canada 2001 Duty - 15.7% 
Steel wires and 
certain steel alloys 
USA 2002 Anti-dumping margin - 116.37% 
Ferrosilicium India 2002 Difference between $740 per tonne and 
cost of commodity 
Pipe products EU 2002 30.9% - 44.1% 
Source: International Monetary Fund, ‘Ukraine: Selected Issues’, IMF Country 
Report No. 03/173 (June 2003), p. 51. 
 
According to the IMF and WTO data, Ukraine has been ten times more likely to have 
anti-dumping measures imposed against it as the country’s share in the international trade 
could suggest. Apart from the anti-dumping investigations, the IMF 2003 Ukraine report 
has pointed out a large number of other market access restraints have been imposed on 
the Ukrainian steel exporters:  
 
For instance, over the January 1995 – June 2002 period, out of a total 1,161 
anti-dumping measures, WTO member countries imposed 37 measures on 
Ukraine. The 3 percent share of measures imposed on Ukraine is 
disproportionate to the 0.3 percent Ukrainian share of world exports, but it is 
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partly explained by WTO members propensity to impose measures on metal 
trade (one-third of all measures) and the dominating role of metal products in 
Ukrainian exports (about 40 percent of total exports) … Only 80 countries 
have had any anti-dumping measure imposed and relative to its importance in 
the world trading system, only Moldova has had more anti-dumping measures 
imposed than Ukraine. WTO trading partners that have imposed anti-dumping 
measures against Ukrainian exports include Canada (3 measures), Chile (2), 
Colombia (2), EU (8), India (4), Mexico (4), Turkey (2), U.S. (5), and 
Venezuela (2). […] Apart from the imposition of antidumping duties, 
Ukrainian exports are also subject to quotas and licensing based on 
intergovernmental agreements. Agreements currently in place govern exports 
of various metal products to the EU, the U.S., Indonesia, and Russia. […] The 
EU and the U.S. have both designated Russia and Kazakhstan as market 
economies, but Ukrainian efforts at receiving a similar designation has not 
met with success […] In general, Ukraine has trouble penetrating world 
markets, because protection is relatively high in exactly the product lines 
where Ukraine has a comparative advantage (e.g., metals, grains, and other 
agricultural products). For instance, in addition to the … new quota on grain 
imports, the EU … has lowered the quota on ready-made rolled metals to 
180,000 tons for 2003, from 355,000 tons in 2002. Furthermore, Ukraine is at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Central and Eastern European countries 
that have received trade concessions from the EU not also granted to Ukraine. 
With the upcoming EU enlargement in 2004 this competitive disadvantage 
vis-à-vis prospective EU members in the current EU market will increase; at 
the same time, exports to prospective EU member countries may be 
negatively affected as these countries adopt the common EU tariff and other 
protection policies (IMF Country Report: Ukraine. Selected Issues No. 
03/173, June 2003: 50-53). 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL BACKWARDNESS 
 
The third long-term challenge to the Ukrainian iron and steel industry under post-
communism has been its obsolete production capacities and out-dated technology. The 
low levels of efficiency, productivity and profitability, which have characterised the 
Ukrainian iron and steel industry under post-communism, are due to the industry’s 
technological backwardness and low value-added product assortment. Table 5 
summarises technological characteristics of the major European, Asian, and American 
steel industries. It shows that the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector is currently the only 
industry in the world that still heavily relies on the open-hearth furnace production 
technology. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that the Ukrainian steel industry has been the 
slowest in the world in up-grading its production capacities towards more modern and 
efficient technological styles. By contrast, the world crude steel production has decisively 
moved towards oxygen-converter and electric furnace production technologies. Even the 
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world’s least modernised steel industries of China, India, and Eastern Europe abandoned 
the open-hearth furnace production in the 1990s. 
 
Table 5. Crude Steel Production by Process, 1990, 1995, 2002 
  Open hearth 
furnaces 
% 
Oxygen blown 
converters 
% 
Electric 
furnaces 
% 
Other
 
% 
Ukraine 1990 52.7 40.5 6.8 - 
 1995 51.6 42.7 5.7 - 
 2002 47.2 49.9 2.9 - 
Poland 1990 29.1 52.9 18.0 - 
 1995 12.8 64.7 22.5 - 
 2002 0.1 69.3 30.6 - 
Russia 1995 42.0 45.2 12.8 - 
 2002 23.7 61.4 14.9 - 
Czechia 1995 4.6 82.3 13.1 - 
 2002 0.0 91.9 8.1 - 
Kazakhstan 1995 12.4 85.2 2.3 - 
 2002 0.0 100.0 0.0 - 
Romania 1995 14.8 62.3 22.9 - 
 2002 0.0 52.7 47.3 - 
EU-15 1995 0.0 65.1 34.9 - 
 2002 0.0 58.9 41.1 - 
USA 1995 0.0 59.6 40.4 - 
 2002 0.0 49.3 50.7 - 
Japan 1995 0.0 67.7 32.3 - 
 2002 0.0 72.9 27.1 - 
China  1995 13.7 49.2 19.0 18.1 
 2002 1.1 71.9 16.0 11.0 
S.Korea 1995 0.0 62.2 37.8 - 
 2002 0.0 54.8 45.2 - 
Brazil 1995 1.3 81.1 17.6 - 
 2002 0.0 79.8 20.2 - 
India 1995 18.7 51.3 30.0 - 
 2002 6.9 50.3 42.7 - 
World 1995 7.3 57.5 32.6 2.6 
 2002 3.8 60.0 33.9 2.2 
Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine 1999 
(Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Statistical Yearbook of 
Ukraine 2002 (Kyiv: Technical, 2003); Polish Central Statistical Office, Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2000 (Warsaw: GUS, 2001); International Iron and 
Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: IISI, 2004); International Iron 
and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition (Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
 
Another cause of the poor profitability and efficiency of the Ukrainian steel industry is its 
specialisation in unfinished and semi-finished low value-added products. Table 6 
provides the international crude steel output break-down by product in 2001 and 2002. It 
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shows that, besides Kazakhstan’s ferrous metals sector, the Ukrainian steel industry is the 
only steel industry in the world, which has been overwhelmingly dominated by the 
production of ingots – the most elementary crude steel product. Furthermore, the 
Ukrainian steel producers have appeared to be the slowest in moving towards the 
production of other crude steel materials. 
 
Table 6. Crude Steel Production by Product, 2001-02 
 Crude steel production by product, % of total production 
 Ingots 
 
Continuously cast 
slabs and billets 
Liquid steel for 
castings 
 
Total 
 
 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002  
Ukraine 78.6 78.5 19.8 19.9 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Russia 45.8 42.6 50.9 54.3 3.3 3.1 100.0 
Poland 39.7 21.7 59.0 71.7 1.2 1.2 100.0 
Czechia 10.6 8.5 87.1 89.0 2.3 2.5 100.0 
Kazakhstan 100.0 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 100.0 
Romania 22.6 16.4 77.4 83.6 0.0 0.0 100.0 
EU (15) 3.2 2.9 96.2 96.6 0.7 0.5 100.0 
USA 3.1 2.8 96.9 97.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Japan 2.1 1.9 97.5 97.8 0.4 0.3 100.0 
China 9.3 7.0 89.9 92.5 0.8 0.6 100.0 
S.Korea 1.2 1.1 98.5 98.6 0.3 0.3 100.0 
Brazil 8.3 7.3 91.6 92.6 0.1 0.1 100.0 
India 36.6 34.7 63.3 65.2 0.1 0.1 100.0 
World 12.1 10.8 87.2 88.6 0.7 0.6 100.0 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2003 (Brussels: 
IISI, 2004); International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition 
(Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
 
FRAGMENTARY OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATION 
 
This paper recognises the collapse of Ukraine’s local market for ferrous metals, which has 
forced the domestic steel producers to become fully dependent on volatile overseas 
markets, as well as the industry’s technological backwardness, as the three fundamental 
long-term challenges that the Ukrainian steel sector has been faced with. It is contended, 
however, that the particularly unstable performance of the industry during the post-
communist transformation has also originated from two other problems of a more short-
term nature. The first more immediate problem of the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector is 
privatisation and the overall transformation of property and control arrangements across 
the entire national economy. By 2004, except for Kryvorizhstal – the largest steel 
 42
manufacturing and exporting enterprise – Ukraine’s all major ferrous metals companies 
have been privatised. However, the state has retained a certain degree of share-holding or 
management presence in the privatised steel companies. Furthermore, the Ukrainian steel 
producers have also had to cope with a fragmented property composition of their major 
suppliers and consumers. According to Figure 24, by the end of 2002, 84 per cent of 
Ukraine’s metals output was produced by the privatised steel companies. However, the 
bulk of Ukraine’s iron ore mines and the majority of coal mines have remained in the 
state ownership. On the other hand, the coal coking branch of the industry – the primary 
consumer of coal and the vital fuel supplier of the steel-producing enterprises – has been 
almost totally privatised.  
 
Figure 24. The ownership structure of Ukraine’s metals sector and its major 
domestic customers, 31st December 2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003). 
 
The loss of management and co-ordination during the process of privatisation has had a 
detrimental effect on the economic performance of most of the Ukrainian steel works. A 
number of large iron and steel combines, iron ore mines and coal-coking pants have been 
partially privatised by or put under the private management control of simultaneously 
several competing Ukrainian industrial holding companies. The subsequent establishment 
of divergent property arrangements have created a number of major difficulties with 
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regard to the reliability of input and output provisions. Moreover, the fragmented 
ownership structure has propelled the huge principal-agent problem of resource 
allocation, which inevitably arises when property ownership and control are separated. 
The principal-agent problem has been exacerbated under post-communism through non-
transparent commercial dealings between state-owned enterprises and private firms.  
 
The constant process of consolidation has been one of the major characteristics of the 
world steel industry in the 1990s. As a result, a large number of steel companies in 
Western Europe, East Asia, and North America have either merged nationally (e.g. 
ThyssenKrupp) or turned into multinational enterprises through acquisitions and mergers 
accomplished abroad (e.g. the LNM Group, Arcelor, Corus). The fragmentary ownership 
transformation of the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector has become the main impediment to 
the industry’s domestic consolidation. Table 7 shows that none of Ukraine’s largest steel 
producers have been large enough to enter the league of the world’s top 20 steel 
companies. 
 
Table 7. The world’s major steel-producing countries and companies, crude steel 
output, million tonnes, 2002 
Rank Tonnage Country Rank Tonnage Company 
1 181.6 China 1 44.0 Arcelor 
2 107.7 Japan 2 34.8 LNM Group 
3 92.2 United States 3 29.8 Nippon Steel 
4 59.8 Russia 4 28.1 POSCO 
5 45.4 South Korea 5 19.5 Shanghai Baosteel 
6 45.0 Germany 6 16.8 Corus 
7 33.4 Ukraine 7 16.4 Thyssen Krupp 
8 29.6 Brazil 8 15.2 NKK 
9 28.8 India 9 15.0 Riva 
10 26.1 Italy 10 14.4 U.S. Steel 
11 20.3 France 11 13.7 Kawasaki 
12 18.2 Taiwan 12 12.4 Nucor 
13 16.5 Turkey 13 11.8 Sumitomo 
14 16.4 Spain 14 11.5 Gerdau 
15 16.0 Canada …26 6.9 Kryvorizhstal 
16 14.1 Mexico …30 6.1 Mariupol Illich 
17 11.7 United Kingdom …45 4.7 Azovstal 
18 11.3 Belgium …55 3.9 Zaporizhstal 
19 9.1 South Africa …69 3.2 Alchevsk 
20 8.4 Poland …80 2.8 DniproPetrovsky 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute, World Steel in Figures: 2003 Edition 
(Brussels: IISI, 2003). 
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RESOURCE SHORTAGES 
The shortage of raw materials and resource inputs has recently become the second short-
term problem of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry. Figure 25 shows that since 1998, 
when the Ukrainian steel industry returned to the stable growth path, the output of iron 
and manganese ores and coal – the major raw materials used for the production of ferrous 
metals in Ukraine – has not been adequately recovering. The resource shortage problem, 
reportedly suffered by a large number of Ukraine’s steel works, is exacerbated by the fact 
that an increasingly large share of domestically-produced iron ore and coke has been 
exported abroad, destabilising the local price levels.  
 
Figure 25. Raw materials and crude steel production, 1990-2003 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2003); Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, Vyrobnytstvo osnovnykh vydiv promyslovoi 
produktsii po misiatsiakh 2003 roku; available at 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2003/pr/ovp/ovp_u/arh_ovp.html. 
 
Moreover, a large number of raw material-supplying enterprises (e.g. iron ore processing 
and concentrating factories, coal mines, coking plants) were privatised by very few 
owners, who have gained an almost monopoly market position in the resource base of the 
Ukrainian ferrous metals sector. For example, currently, the A.R.S. – a Donetsk-based 
company – reportedly controls about 90 per cent of Ukraine’s coking coal-mining and 
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coke-producing enterprises and, thus, is able to exercise undue bargaining powers on the 
domestic market.  The protracted privatisation of Ukraine’s iron ore- and coal-mining 
industrial branches has only added to the generally uncertain and unstable supply of local 
raw materials. 
 
CURRENT POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
 
The election of Leonid Kuchma, a representative of Eastern Ukrainian industrialist 
circles, as Ukraine’s President in July 1994 is considered to be the starting point for the 
creation of the current national industrial policy environment. From the very beginning, 
the transformation of Ukrainian heavy industries has appeared on the list of major 
priorities of the Kuchma administration. The central public policy document with regard 
to the Ukrainian iron and steel industry is ‘The Conception of the Development of 
Ukraine’s Mining and Metallurgical Complex until 2010’ approved by the Verkhovna 
Rada††, Ukraine’s parliament, on 17 October 1995 (Vidomosti Verkhovnoï Rady No. 39, 
1995).  The Conception has emphasised the leading regulatory role of the state to be 
played in the process of essential industrial restructuring, privatisation, and adjustment of 
Ukraine’s metals sector to the realities of post-communism and globalisation. This public 
policy document has also recognised the Ukrainian steel industry’s problems in the 
spheres of production technology, product diversification, and international marketing, 
and provided for a number of activities aimed at the transformation of the Ukrainian 
metals sector into a more balanced, competitive, efficient, and environmentally conscious 
industry.  
 
Nonetheless, the probability of the economic forecasting provided in the document and 
the level of understanding by the Conception’s authors of the political economy of 
international trade have all proven to be inadequate. Table 8 confronts the real finished 
rolled steel output figures with the Concept’s forecast. It shows that the Ukrainian steel 
industry has reached the 25 million tonne a year output level nine years earlier than 
previously forecasted. One should emphasise that the Conception’s threshold of 25 
million tonnes per year was calculated on the basis of existing raw material capacities.  
Thus, the current steel output expansion and the resultant shortages of raw materials have 
not been anticipated. The Conception has also underestimated the significance of the 
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overseas market for the Ukrainian ferrous metals and, subsequently, totally neglected the 
potential threat of protectionist measures to be applied against the Ukrainian steel 
companies by a number of foreign governments. 
 
Table 8. The production of finished rolled ferrous metals in Ukraine, forecast and 
real output figures, 1995-2010, million tonnes 
 1995 2000 2001 2002 2005 2010 
Forecast 18 20 n.d. n.d. 22 25 
Real output 16.6 22.6 25.4 26.4 n.a. n.a. 
Source: The forecast figures are taken from ‘The Conception of the Development of 
Ukraine’s Mining and Smelting Complex until 2010’, Vidomosti Verkhovnoï Rady No. 
39, 1995. The real output data are from the Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukraïny za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2003). 
 
The ‘Conception of the Development of Ukraine’s Mining and Metallurgical Complex’ 
has been followed by a number of legislative initiatives and executive orders concerning 
the operation and restructuring of the Ukrainian iron and steel industry. The Laws of 
Ukraine ‘On Economic Experiment at Enterprises of Ukraine’s Mining and Metallurgical 
Complex’ (valid from 14 August 1999 until 1 January 2002),  and ‘On the Further 
Development of Ukraine’s Mining and Metallurgical Complex’ (valid from 1 January 
2002 until 1 January 2003), provided the majority of domestic steel producers with a 
number of state assistance measures: (a) penalties and fines charged for untimely paid 
taxes, duties, and other mandatory payments were written off; (b) ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals enterprises were provided with tax allowances for fixed assets depreciation; (c) 
some share of the mandatory payment by metals companies of the ‘state innovation fund’ 
tax, the ‘enterprise profit’ tax, the ‘value-added’ tax, and the ‘environmental pollution’ 
duty were to remain at the respective companies and used directly for technology 
improvements and environmental safety measures; and (d) ferrous and non-ferrous metals 
companies covered by the two laws concerned were released from paying the ‘general 
usage motor-way maintenance’ duty (see Vidomosti Verkhovnoï Rady No. 38, 1999 and 
Vidomosti Verkhovnoï Rady No. 17, 2002). 
 
Ukraine’s ferrous metals enterprises situated in the Donbas have also been affected by the 
Law of Ukraine ‘On Special Economic Zones and a Special Regime of Investment 
Activities in Donetsk oblast’, valid from 14 January 1999. This Law has established a 
special regime of investment activities within Donetsk oblast’s territories of priority 
development, which currently cover almost the entire provincial area. Subject to the 
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proposed investment of at least US$ 1 million (US$ 250,000 for small firms), a 
commercial entity which operates within the priority development territory is provided 
with a large number of tax breaks and allowances, customs duty and other incentives for 
the period of 30 years (see Table 9). The Donbas ferrous metals companies, as a result, 
have been able to make additional fixed capital investments within this special regulatory 
regime. 
 
Table 9. Tax incentives provided in priority development territories, Donetsk oblast, 
1999 
Type of exemption Priority Development Territory 
Duration 30 years 
Corporate income tax 0% rate for the first 3 years; 50% of the current 
tax rate afterwards* 
Value-added tax 0% rate for the first 5 years 
Non-resident personal income tax 2/3 of the current tax rate 
Investor dividend tax 10% rate 
Custom duties 0% rate for the first 5 years 
Social insurance contributions 50% of the current rate 
Minimum investment project US$ 1 million; US$ 250,000 for small firms 
Note: Provided profit is gained during the next 4 to 6 years 
Source: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, ‘The Law of Ukraine: On Special Economic Zones 
and a Special Regime of Investment Activities in Donetsk Oblast’, available at 
http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi. 
 
Besides the legislative regulation of Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector, another sphere of the 
state industrial policy has been focused on privatisation and the establishment of large 
domestic conglomerates, commonly referred to as ‘financial and industrial groups’. By 
April 2004, except for the fully state-owned Kryvorizhstal Iron and Steel Combine, the 
Mariupol Illich Iron and Steel Combine (management-employee buy-out), and the 
UkrRudProm State Iron Ore Holding Company, all other ferrous metals enterprises in the 
country were either privatised or designated for privatisation by Ukraine’s largest 
conglomerates such as: the Industrial Union of the Donbas (ISD; Donetsk-based); System 
Capital Management (SCM; Donetsk-based) and its affiliates (D.A.N.K.O. and A.R.S; 
both Donetsk-based); the Interpipe Group (Interpipe; Dnipropetrovsk-based); the Private 
Group (PryvatBank; Dnipropetrovsk-based); the Ukrainian-Siberian Bank Group 
(UkrSybBank; Kharkiv-based); the Finance & Credit Group (Finansy i Kredyt; Kyiv-
based). Figure 26 shows the extent of involvement of Ukraine’s largest conglomerates in 
the ferrous metals sector, ranging from coal mines and iron ore deposits to special steel 
alloys and international marketing. 
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Figure 26. The Ukrainian financial & industrial groups’ interests in the ferrous metals sector 
Note: Data in italics indicate that the firm belongs to the list of top 100 largest companies of Ukraine or to the respective sectoral list of largest companies. 
Source: Author’s construction of the basis of The Korrespondent Kyiv Post Weekly, 10 January 2003; Dannye o korporatsii (Donetsk: ISD, 2004); Ukrainian 
Investment Gazette, Top 100: Reiting luchshykh kompanii Ukrainy (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia Investitsionnaia Gazeta, June 2003), and various periodical publications. 
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ASSESSING THE CURRENT PUBLIC POLICY OUTCOMES 
There have been a number of positive developments generated by the recent policy 
reforms and newly-established state assistance mechanisms. The Ukrainian steel industry 
experiment and the regional policy investment incentives have led to a substantial 
increase in fixed capital investment into the ferrous metals sector. Figure 27 shows that 
since the late 1990s, the amount of steel capital investment has been growing. Moreover, 
the Ukrainian steel companies have also been engaged in some labour restructuring. The 
total workforce employed by the Ukrainian ferrous metals industry has declined from 
447,000 in 1990 to 423,000 in 2002. 
 
Figure 27. Capital investment and labour employment in the Ukrainian steel 
industry, 1990-2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 2000); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Technical, 
2003). 
 
Moreover, certain modernisation of production capacities undertaken by a number of 
Ukrainian steel companies in the course of the sectoral experiment has resulted in 
substantial efficiency gains. Figure 28 shows that energy and fuel consumption levels 
have been considerably reduced in all but one technological process within the ferrous 
metals production cycle. 
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Figure 28. Energy efficiency developments in Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector, 1996-
2002 
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Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, 
Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1999 rik (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 2000); Ukrainian State 
Statistics Committee, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik (Kyiv: Tekhnika, 
2003). 
 
Nonetheless, the current public policy instruments have not provided an effective 
response to the drastic collapse of the domestic market for Ukrainian ferrous metals. As 
Figure 23 (page 37) has shown, the recovery of Ukraine’s heavy engineering and 
construction has been lagging far behind the domestic steel output growth. Furthermore, 
the Ukrainian government has not been able to adequately address the detrimental effects 
emanating from the disproportionate discrimination of the country’s steel producers 
overseas. The Ukrainian government has failed so far to secure its membership in the 
World Trade Organisation or, at least, to negotiate successfully granting of the market 
economy status for the country. The Ukrainian authorities have been addressing the 
problem of the fragmentary ownership transformation of the industrial sector by 
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facilitating the establishment of large national conglomerates based on ferrous metals. 
While this strategy has provided a certain incentive for the industry’s consolidation and 
overall management improvement, it has also led to a number of privatisation conflicts 
between different conglomerates around particular steel works and other ferrous metals 
enterprises. Figure 26 above shows that a large number of steel works, mines, and 
factories are owned and/or controlled by at least two difference holding companies. 
Reportedly, such situations have not been beneficial for the output stability and 
production efficiency of the Ukrainian ferrous metals industry per se. Ukraine’s current 
public policies vis-à-vis the domestic steel industry have also failed to adequately address 
the problem of raw material shortages suffered by a number of largest steel companies. 
The acuteness of the resource shortage problem has not been anticipated, while the 
monopolisation of the industry’s resource base has not been properly tackled.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has overviewed the Ukrainian ferrous metals sector – the industrial branch of 
an overwhelming importance for the national economy. It has shown that the Ukrainian 
iron and steel industry entered the period of the post-communist transformation as a fully-
grown and densely-located manufacturing sector. This paper has also examined the 
economic outcomes generated by the Ukrainian iron and steel industry in the course of 
the post-communist transformation. It has argued that one of the main outcomes of 
Ukraine’s post-communist transition has been a massive, sharp, deep, and long decline in 
the ferrous metals output. The Ukrainian iron and steel industry in transition has also been 
characterised by deteriorating efficiency, falling labour productivity, low returns on 
investment, and mediocre profits. On the whole, in the 1990s, the Ukrainian ferrous 
metals sector has gone through an extremely unstable economic period. The remarkable 
export expansion has been undertaken by the Ukrainian steel companies under highly 
volatile conditions of the international steel markets.  
 
The recovery of the ferrous metals industry has preceded the overall revival of Ukraine’s 
industrial sector by at least two years. Since the end of 1998, the Ukrainian iron and steel 
industry has followed a generally upward growth path. Nonetheless, whilst the delayed 
revival of the Ukrainian manufacturing sector has been almost linear, by contrast, the 
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steel industry has been growing in a rather haphazard way. The export sales revenues and 
profit earnings reported by the Ukrainian ferrous metals companies have also been erratic. 
Moreover, while a small number of Ukraine’s steel works have recently taken the leading 
market positions, the majority of the ferrous metals companies are clearly lagging far 
behind, while some enterprises have apparently been reduced to rubble. 
 
This paper has analysed a number of causes of the unusually poor performance of 
Ukraine’s ferrous metals sector. It has discovered five major challenges the industry has 
been faced with since the beginning of the 1990s. It has been contended that the collapse 
of Ukraine’s domestic steel market and the industry’s resultant dependence upon the 
volatile markets overseas constitute the first two fundamental long-term challenges to the 
sustainability of the Ukrainian ferrous metals industry. The industry’s obsolete production 
technology and its undeveloped steel product assortment have been identified as the third 
long-term developmental challenge. This paper has also recognised Ukraine’s protracted 
privatisation process, which has produced a fragmentary ownership structure, as well as 
the growing shortage of raw materials within the ferrous metals sector, as the industry’s 
two core short-term problems. It has been argued further that, apart from the 
technological gap challenge, the current public policy environment has not provided an 
adequate response to the industry’s transformation challenges. 
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